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INTRODUCTION
[A]s if clicking one’s heels and wishing to find oneself in a land free of . . .
Rule 10b-5 were enough to make it happen.1
When investors in the public capital markets lose money, they sue;
when investors in private equity market lose money, they do not.2  That
private equity funds have largely managed to not only avoid public regula-
tion, but to avoid private investor suits,3 is uncanny.  After all, Securities
* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School, May 2013.
1. James C. Spindler, The Going Private Phenomenon: How Private is Private Equity,
& at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009).
2. Id. at 315-16 (finding that “firms [in public capital markets] can count on being
sued almost any time they lose substantial amounts of money; in some contexts, such as
initial public offerings, the overall incidence of lawsuits rose as high as, for instance, 39 per-
cent in high-tech industries in the peak bubble years of 1999 and 2000.” Additionally, “[w]e
might expect, in general, that a limited partner who lost money on speculative ventures
would often sue its general partner. But quite to the contrary, this does not appear to happen
very often at all.”).
3. Id. at 311-312 (“The very essence of private equity is exemption from the public
securities laws . . . .  Staying below the regulatory radar is paramount. The breadth of the
law’s reach, and what one must do to escape it, largely defines what private equity is.”).
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and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-54—the “chief” antifraud
action available to private investors5—“applies just as much to purchases
and sales of limited partnership interests [in private equity firms] as it does
to purchases and sales of publicly traded securities.”6  However, with the
financial crisis and the subsequent passing of the Dodd-Frank Act, the pri-
vate equity market is running out of luck.  The industry, newly exposed to
investor suits, is no longer able to avoid litigation over investors’ losses.
This note demonstrates why private equity will no longer be able to
avoid private investor suits as it has (mostly) done in the past and explores
the industry’s response to a growing number of investor suits.  Notably,
the industry has already begun to shift its strategy from regulatory avoid-
ance to regulatory capture, at least in part to avoid investor suits.  Given
these changes, this note proposes that the best way to maintain discipline
in the transforming private equity market is to protect the ability of inves-
tors to bring private suits.
The note proceeds as follows.  Part I outlines how private equity has
avoided investor suits in the past, particularly by keeping limited partner
investors to a minimum.  Part II describes changes to the market and regu-
latory environment—specifically the financial crisis and the Dodd-Frank
Act—that have made the industry increasingly vulnerable to investor suits,
and gives a brief description of why 10b-5 investor suits are the proper tool
to take advantage of the changes described.  Part III examines a wider
securities suit context, in which some judges have responded to increased
liability for other securities issuers by erecting judicial barriers to 10b-5
suits.  Part IV reviews George Stigler’s theory that industries, when they
become powerful enough, demand regulation, or attempt to capture it,
and suggests that the behavior of the private equity industry already fits
this description.  Part V concludes that 10b-5 investor suits are the best
tool for maintaining discipline in the private equity industry and proposes
changes to judicial inferences and the JOBS Act (described in Parts III
and IV, respectively) that will protect 10b-5’s role in disciplining the
market.
I. PRIVATE EQUITY: SOLVING AGENCY PROBLEMS BELOW
THE REGULATORY RADAR
The breadth of the [securities laws’] reach, and what one must do to escape
it, largely defines what private equity is.7
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
5. Spindler, supra note 1, at 316.
6. Id. Indeed, 10b-5, in conjunction with the other securities laws, is particularly diffi-
cult to avoid because Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act restricts what can be
disclaimed in a contract, and because any disclosures a firm makes are subject to 10b-5’s
antifraud liability standard. Id. at 322-23.
7. Id. at 312.
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Private equity, heretofore, has largely been a study in flying “below the
regulatory radar.”8  Private equity funds do this by avoiding the securities
laws9 and the SEC rules and regulations that help implement them (in-
cluding SEC Rule 10b-5, which gives investors a private right of action
considered consistent with SEC enforcement).10  This practice, however,
has been changing since the financial crisis—and not just because Mitt
Romney’s 2012 presidential candidacy made it harder for private equity to
“stay in the shadows.”11
This part: (1) explains the philosophy motivating the private equity
fund strategy of leveraged buyouts; (2) outlines the ways in which private
equity funds can expose themselves to the dual-liability of public enforce-
ment and private investor suits; and (3) describes how private equity has
avoided public enforcement and private investor suits.  Part II then dis-
cusses why the private equity industry is finding it increasingly difficult to
avoid private securities suits.
A. Private Equity as a Solution to Agency Problems
If we are to assume that the desire for personal profit is the prime force
motivating control, we must conclude that the interests of control are differ-
ent from, and often radically opposed to, those of ownership; that the own-
ers most emphatically will not be served by a profit-seeking controlling
group.12
Private equity—a term that gets applied to a variety of investment ve-
hicles and strategies—is fundamentally an approach to investing that at-
8. Id. at 311-312 (“The very essence of private equity is exemption from the public
securities laws . . . . Staying below the regulatory radar is paramount. The breadth of the law’s
reach, and what one must do to escape it, largely defines what private equity is.”).
9. E.g., the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (2006); the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (2006); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006); Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1to -2
(2006).
10. See Eileen Appelbaum & Rosemary Batt, A Primer on Private Equity at Work 5
(2012), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/publications/private-equity-2012-02.pdf.
11. Maureen Farrell, SEC To Step Up Scrutiny of Private Equity Firms, CNN MONEY
(Jan. 27, 2012, 12:09 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/26/markets/private_equity_SEC/in-
dex.htm (“The private equity world is struggling to stay in the shadows. It’s harder to do so
with Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney getting criticized for his private equity
roots.”); see also Dan McCrum, Private Equity Profits Called into Question, FIN. TIMES (Jan.
23, 2012, 9:42 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d3b9614a-42f1-11e1-b756-00144feab49a.html
(“The [private equity] industry faces mounting political scrutiny as the presidential candidacy
of Mitt Romney, a former private equity executive, has drawn attention to its business model
and favourable tax treatment.”); D.M. Levine, Private Equity Gears Up For PR and Lobby-
ing Blitz, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2012, 8:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
02/18/private-equity-public-relations-lobbying_n_1284604.html (According to one executive
at a global private equity firm, 2012 was to be the year that shaped the entire industry).
12. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY 114 (Harcourt, Brace & World rev. ed. 1968) (1933).
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tempts to address the agency problems inherent in the modern, publically-
traded firm.13  Private equity “close[s] the gap between ownership and
control”14 through the leveraged buyout: the fund identifies companies
that they believe can be improved through direct management, buys a
public company (or more accurately a number of companies), takes that
company private, and then attempts to improve the value of the company
in order to resell it (either publically or privately) later.  Private equity
funds thus “hold out the promise of eliminating the modern corporation’s
agency problems by concentrating ownership and control in a single insti-
tution [i.e. the private equity fund itself].”15
B. Private Equity’s Exposure—Four Vulnerable Points
Private equity funds face two regulatory threats, both created by the
securities laws: public enforcement of the securities laws and private suits
brought by investors.  The SEC, and to a lesser extent other agencies, such
as the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), enforces the
securities laws in a number of ways including: by issuing subpoenas,16 issu-
ing cease and desist orders (§ 21C), suspending a violator’s ability to trade
(§ 12(k)), barring officers and directors from serving as officers and direc-
tors of public companies or working in the securities industry,17 ordering a
company to comply with disclosure rules (§ 15(c)(4)), or publically scold-
ing a company (§ 21(a)).  Private investors, also under the authority of the
securities laws, bring “10b-5” suits (or “actions”).18  10b-5 suits are inves-
tor suits brought pursuant to SEC Rule 10b-5, which was promulgated by
the SEC under the authority provided by § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.
Investor suits can be brought on behalf of investors (as a class action) or
on behalf of the public corporation itself (as a “derivative suit”).
Private equity funds typically only expose themselves to both SEC en-
forcement of the securities laws (i.e. public enforcement) and to private
investors’ suits by entering the public markets in some way.  Both the SEC
and private investors lack recourse through the securities laws (though
13. See id.
14. Stephen F. Diamond, Beyond the Berle and Means Paradigm: Private Equity and
the New Capitalist Order 12 (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Papers Series, Work-
ing Paper No. 10-01, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15
44599.
15. Id. at 26.
16. Alison Frankel, After Libor, Arguments Against Financial Regulation Are a Joke,
REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/12/19/after-libor-argu-
ments-against-financial-regulation-are-a-joke/ (“[R]egulators armed with subpoenas are the
only hope we’ve got.”).
17. See  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir.
1998).
18. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
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common law fraud claims may still be available to investors) for most
purely private transactions—at least for ones that do not involve fraud.19
Private equity funds expose themselves to public markets in four ways.
First, they can “go public” themselves “by selling a small percentage of
their management firms to outside investors.”20  Second, private equity
funds sometimes sell corporations “to another corporation for either cash
or shares in the new company.”21  Third, funds invest in public companies,
without immediately or fully taking those companies private, in order to
later sell them privately or through an initial public offering (“IPO”).  Fi-
nally, private equity funds may incorporate into large multi-purpose asset
management firms,22 blurring their private and public roles.23
C. How Private Equity Firms Have Avoided Securities Laws
It is as President Calvin Coolidge once remarked, “I have found out in the
course of a long public life that the things I did not say never hurt me”—and
the same is true for issuers of securities . . . .24
Private equity funds have escaped the securities laws and 10b-5 suits by
staying private allowing them to avoid disclosure (to investors and to the
SEC), cede little to no control to investors, and limit opportunities for
investors to exit their investment in the fund.25
10b-5 suits, promulgated by the SEC under the authority provided by
§ 10(b) of the Exchange Act, require a plaintiff to allege five elements
(hereinafter the “Daou test”26): “(1) a material misrepresentation or omis-
sion of fact, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a
security (“traceability”), (4) transaction and loss causation, and (5) eco-
nomic loss.”27  By limiting disclosure, private equity funds also limit op-
19. Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private
Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital-Raising 15 (Geo. L. & Econ. Research Paper, Paper
No. 12-031, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132813
(“Truly private offerings become ‘fraud-only’ . . . .”); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561 (1995).
20. Diamond, supra note 14, at 4.
21. Id. at 19.
22. See, e.g., Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2011).
23. See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 34 (“[A]s private equity, hedge funds,
and sovereign wealth funds are increasingly incorporated into large multi-purpose asset man-
agement firms, the distinctions among them have begun to blur. PE invests in publicly-traded
enterprises; hedge funds buy the distressed debt of PE-owned portfolio companies; while
sovereign wealth funds take on the limited partner role and invest in PE funds”).
24. Spindler, supra note 1, at 323-24.
25. Id. at 325 (“In sum, then, for a fund that wants to remain beyond the purview of
the public antifraud regime, the three ingredients of little or no disclosure to investors, little
or no investor control, and reduced avenues of investor exit are all key.”).
26. Some approaches condense loss causation and economic loss. See, e.g., Dura
Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
27. In re Daou Sys. Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005).
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portunities for investors to claim that a fund’s agents made fraudulent
statements or negligent misrepresentations (or omissions) that satisfy the
first element of this test.28  Limiting disclosure can also make scienter
harder to plead because scienter is often plead by comparing inconsistent
statements.  Restraining investor control similarly denies investors the
ability to obtain information that investors might use to plead those first
two factors.  Finally, limiting opportunities for investor exit prevents plain-
tiffs from pleading the third, fourth, and fifth elements of a 10b-5 suit: that
there was a purchase or sale that resulted in an economic loss.  If no sale
was permitted, there cannot have been any transaction that resulted in
loss.
Note that private equity funds face liability for two types of transac-
tions.  First, funds may face suits brought by their own investors.  Second,
when funds exit their investments (i.e. by selling the company they in-
vested in and turned around) they often do so with a public offering.
Funds may be sued by the investors (i.e. the shareholders) who buy shares
in such an offering as well.
Despite the fact that disclosure obligations, especially at the public of-
fering stage, are “enormous,” and statements are “subject to strict liability
for material misstatements and omissions,” private equity funds have
avoided 10b-5 actions by avoiding disclosure to investors and the SEC.29
At the macro (and most straightforward) level, private equity funds
avoid disclosures by staying private.  The Exchange Act empowers the
SEC to monitor “publicly-traded firms via requirements for registration,
public reporting, and detailed record keeping.”30  Investors, and plaintiffs’
firms, frequently base 10b-5 suits on claims that 10-K and 10-Q disclosures
made to the SEC by a company and its management were false.31  Private
equity funds avoid the Exchange Act and disclosures to the SEC by taking
public companies private and remaining private themselves (i.e. they regis-
ter as limited partnerships).
28. Typically, plaintiffs allege that disclosures made by senior managers themselves
constitute the fraudulent statements or negligent misrepresentation. Often, plaintiffs will
then claim that subsequent disclosures by managers constitute admissions that previous state-
ments were fraudulent. These later admissions can be particularly important when pleading
scienter (whether corporate or individual scienter). See, e.g., Institutional Investors Grp. v.
Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 275 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[Shareholders] point to an April statement by
[Defendant], which they construe as an “admission” that “he was fully aware [of unusual
discounting] during the Class Period,” even as early as the first quarter.”); Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc. (“Tellabs II”), 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) (Finding that
“[t]here would be a strong inference of corporate scienter [where a] dramatic . . . announce-
ment [revealed information that] would have been approved by corporate officials suffi-
ciently knowledgeable about the company to know that the announcement was false.”).
29. Spindler, supra note 1, at 320-21.
30. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
31. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The falsely
inflated earnings figures that resulted from these improper practices were then used in [de-
fendant]’s filings with the SEC during the class period and in company press releases an-
nouncing quarterly results”).
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At the micro level, private equity funds avoid disclosure by limiting the
quantity of investors they sell limited partner interests to and restricting
those sales to “accredited investors.”  The Securities Act, which prohibits
fraud, also compels companies to supply investors with information on the
company’s business operations, financial statements, and risk factors.32
Private equity funds, however, take advantage of a “safe harbor” exemp-
tion offered under Regulation D33 and § 4(2) of the Securities Act,34
which allows them to avoid those disclosure requirements when privately
placing limited partner interests by offering sales to only “accredited in-
vestors.”35  Private equity funds that have fewer than 100 accredited inves-
tors or 499 “qualified purchasers” are exempt from the reporting and
disclosure requirements of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the
Company Act.36  Accredited investors are wealthy individuals (annual in-
come over $200,000–$300,000 including spouse, or net worth of over $1
million) and large institutional investors (such as pension funds).37  Quali-
fied purchasers have more than $5 million in investments or represent
qualified purchasers with at least $25 million in investments.38  Private eq-
uity funds can keep these numbers low not only by not filing a registration
statement and limiting the numbers of holders of record, but also by hav-
ing “beneficial investment interests held through a limited number of in-
termediaries,” who serve as the holders of record.39
Private equity funds also avoid regulation by relying on two exemp-
tions from the Investment Company Act.  By limiting the number of inves-
tors and assuring that the offering of securities (here the limited
partnerships) remains private, a fund can avoid being classified as an “in-
vestment company.”  Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act “ex-
cludes from the definition of “investment company” any issuer whose
outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially
owned by not more than 100 beneficial owners, and which is not making
and does not currently propose to make a public offering of its securities.”
Section 3(c)(7) of the Act excludes “any issuer whose outstanding securi-
ties are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of
such securities, are “qualified purchasers,” and which is not making and
does not at that time propose to make a public offering of its securities.”40
32. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 5.
33. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
35. Spindler, supra note 1, at 320-21.
36. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 5.
37. Id.; Spindler, supra note 1, at 321-22.
38. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 5.
39. Spindler, supra note 1, at 321-22.
40. Alexandra Poe et al., SEC Proposes New Rules under the JOBS Act, REED SMITH
(Oct. 3, 2012), http://www.reedsmith.com/SEC-Proposes-New-Rules-under-the-JOBS-Act-
10-03-2012/.
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Until recently, private equity funds also secured exemption from the
disclosure rules of the Advisers Act by limiting the number of investors
and restricting investors to only accredited ones.41  The Advisers Act,
among other regulations, required the registration of fund managers.42
Private equity funds were exempt from the Advisers Act if they had fewer
than 15 clients (each fund counts as one client).43  Many private equity
funds manage, nevertheless, to be “extraordinarily large and powerful”
while limiting the number of shareholders to avoid registration and other
regulation.44  The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2010 (“Dodd–Frank Act”) changed this rule, as discussed be-
low.45  Private equity funds still manage to avoid registration and other
regulations
Finally, in addition to reducing mandatory disclosures, private equity
funds take the obvious and prudent step of limiting voluntary disclosures,
“making clear in any contract with fund investors that the fund is required
to disclose little, if any, information.”46
Private equity funds have also avoided 10b-5 actions by limiting inves-
tor control and by reducing the opportunities for investors to exit their
investments.  If investors do not have control over the operations of the
fund they cannot compel disclosure.  As discussed above, investors fre-
quently base 10b-5 claims on information obtained from disclosure.47
And, if investors cannot easily exit their investment, usually because pri-
vate equity funds have long maturity dates and contractually prevent re-
sale, then investor-plaintiffs cannot claim they suffered harm.  If it was not
possible to have suffered harm during the “effective period” of the fraud48
(because purchase or sale was impossible), investors are unable to allege
harm, an essential element of a 10b-5 suit.49
41. Spindler, supra note 1, at 322.
42. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 5.
43. Id.
44. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Se-
curities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 355 (2013).
45. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 5.
46. Spindler, supra note 1, at 323-24.  Note, however, that Section 29(a) voids contrac-
tual agreements to waive compliance with Exchange Act. Id. at 323; 15 U.S.C.A. § 78cc(a)
(West Supp. 2012) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive
compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of
any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”).
47. Spindler, supra note 1, at 323-25.
48. James C. Spindler, Vicarious Liability for Bad Corporate Governance: Are We
Wrong About 10b-5?, 13 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 359, 363 (2011).  Note that the “effective
period” of the fraud is also referred to as the “class period” in 10b-5 class actions. Id.
49. See Spindler, supra note 1, at 324-25 (“[R]estricting rights also restricts the ability
of investors to sue for fraud; if there is nothing the investor can do to act upon disclosure, it
cannot be the case that the disclosure (or lack thereof) harmed the investor.”).
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II. PRIVATE EQUITY EXPOSED: POST-CRISIS MARKET, REGULATORY
CHANGES AND 10B-5 INVESTOR SUIT LIABILITY
From the investor’s vantage point, the private equity market is illiquid and
high-risk, its major enticement being the potential for astronomical (or at
least above-market) returns.50
Private equity funds will have an increasingly difficult time avoiding
the securities laws—including both public enforcement and private inves-
tor suits—because: (1) poor economic conditions have caused credit to dry
up and time horizons to extend, which may encourage previously reticent
investors to sue the general partners of private equity funds; (2) given eco-
nomic difficulty, the biggest players in the private equity industry are in-
creasingly participating in public markets, exposing them to exactly the
type of oversight and litigation risk private equity was designed to avoid;51
(3) funds will not be able to avoid Dodd-Frank Act disclosure require-
ments, which went into force in 2012, in the same way they avoided Ex-
change Act disclosures;52 and (4) the SEC intends to increasingly target
the industry for enforcement.53
This part begins with a quick tour of the 10b-5 private cause of action
and then explains how each market and regulatory change identified here
will increase private equity funds’ exposure to 10b-5 investor suits.  While
other developments, in particular the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act (the “JOBS” Act of 2012),54 will shield some (small and medium
sized) private equity funds from investor suits,55 on balance the regulatory
and market environment is changing in ways that will make the world less
hospitable for private equity funds.
50.  Sam Singer, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Private Equity Era: Ex-
tracting a Hidden Element, 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 273, 283 (2009).
51. Pete Brush, SEC’s Kaplan Details Plan To Target Private Equity, LAW360 (Jan. 27,
2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/304069/sec-s-kaplan-details-plan-to-target-
private-equity (“Kaplan’s comments also come at a time when the biggest players in the
industry, such as The Carlyle Group, are getting bigger and are testing their appeal on public
markets with initial public offerings.”).
52. Farrell, supra note 11 (“Congress’ Wall Street reform legislation, the Dodd-Frank
law, will force private equity firms to disclose more information about their investments and
outside advisors later this year. Kaplan said such disclosure will help the SEC do its work
more easily”).
53. Brush, supra note 51 (“‘There will be more private equity cases coming from the
division of enforcement in coming years than there have been previously,’ Kaplan [co-chief
of the SEC’s asset management unit] said”).
54. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(“An Act To increase American job creation and economic growth by improving access to
the public capital markets for emerging growth companies.”).
55. See Adam C. Pritchard, Revisiting ‘Truth in Securities Revisited’; Abolishing IPOs
and Harnessing Markets in the Public Good (Univ. of Mich. Law & Econ. Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 12-010, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103246.
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A. 10b-5—the chief antifraud private cause of action for private parties
A 10b-5 suit56 is a versatile legal tool for investors who think them-
selves the victims of fraud.  The key reason 10b-5 can be such an effective
tool in targeting private equity is its flexibility.  Under the Howey test57—
from the classic Supreme Court opinion expansively interpreting “invest-
ment contract” in § 2(1) of the Securities Act—“virtually any financing
activity” is considered to involve a security, and is therefore subject to
10b-5 liability.58  Thus, investments in private equity funds, “without re-
gard to whether those securities are publicly traded or have been regis-
tered under the Securities Act or Exchange Act,”59 are subject 10b-5
suits.60
Avoiding 10b-5 suits is difficult.  Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act
imposes “severe limits on the ability of parties to contract around securi-
ties fraud liability” by prohibiting disclaiming of fraud protections.61
Finally, 10b-5 is a tough rule because it has evolved in two specific
ways that make it difficult for defendants: first, cases that survive motions
to dismiss (and motion for summary judgment and class certification—if a
class suit, i.e. not a derivative suit) usually settle;62 and, second, “faced
with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a § 10(b) action, courts must, as
with any motion to dismiss for failure to plead a claim on which relief can
be granted, accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true.”63
56. Spindler lays out this investor remedy’s history:
Rule 10b-5 and Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 make actionable
material misstatements or omissions in the sale or purchase of securities, with a private
right of action granted to investors by the Supreme Court in 1971 in Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. Subsequent developments of legal doctrine allow multi-
ple plaintiff claims to be aggregated into class actions, and, as implemented in the Su-
preme Court case of Basic v. Levinson in 1988, the efficient capital markets hypothesis
creates a market test for the non-scienter elements of fraud (causation, reliance, materi-
ality, and damages). This market test is whether a change in stock price occurred at the
time that information reached the market that corrected the misstatement or omission.
That is, making out a 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market class action is largely a matter of con-
ducting an event study on stock price movement around the time that the market
learned of the fraud.
Spindler, supra note 48 at 363.
57. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946).
58. Spindler, supra note 1, at 320, 334; Howey, 328 US at 297-99.
59. Spindler, supra note 1, at 322-23.
60. Private equity funds can only insulate themselves from the securities laws com-
pletely by making the limited partners—the investors—active managers. Cf. Howey, 328 U.S.
at 298.
61. Spindler, supra note 1, at 322-23 (though “some leeway exists to negotiate the
disclosures to which Rule 10b-5 will apply, any disclosures that are made will be subject to
Rule 10b-5’s antifraud liability standard”).
62. See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 214-15 (3d ed. 2012).
63. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs I), 551 U.S. 308, 332 (2007).
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Thus, though there are a number of elements64 a plaintiff must suffi-
ciently allege to survive the threshold challenges to get to discovery (and
therefore settlement), 10b-5 is a flexible and potent arrow in the plaintiffs’
bar’s quiver.
B. A Stagnant Economy Makes it Easier to Find
Investor-Litigants to Bring Suit
10b-5 suits cannot be brought by just anyone; they need to be brought
on behalf of investors who bought or sold stock during the class period
(and who therefore can plausibly claim to have suffered damages as a di-
rect result of the defendants’ fraud).  Poor economic conditions cause
three developments that will make it easier for plaintiffs’ firms to find in-
vestors willing to sue—private equity funds are: (1) earning lower returns;
(2) making longer-term investments; and (3) taking on new investors.  In-
vestors were not necessarily enamored with the private equity industry
before the financial crisis;65 these market developments should make it
easier for plaintiffs’ firms to find disgruntled investors who bought or sold
stock during the class period and are willing to sue.
First, and most obviously, private equity investors who lose money (or
receive lower returns than anticipated), will be more inclined to sue.  The
more investors willing to serve as plaintiffs, the easier it will be for plain-
tiffs’ firms to bring suits.  And private equity returns in the wake of the
financial crisis are down significantly:
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64. In re Daou Sys. Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005) (enumerating (1) a mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission of fact, (2) scienter, (3) a connection with the purchase or
sale of a security, (4) transaction and loss causation, and (5) economic loss).
65. Singer, supra note 50 (“From the investor’s vantage point, the private equity mar-
ket is illiquid and high-risk, its major enticement being the potential for astronomical (or at
least above-market) returns”).
66. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 23.
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Arguably, funds will no longer be able to stick to their historic commit-
ment of taking cuts from profits only on returns amounting to at least
eight percent.67  Lower returns mean more dissatisfied investors and (pos-
sibly) greater potential for investor suits, especially for funds holding
“high levels of committed funds (so-called ‘dry powder’68), which . . . have
not been . . . put to work earning returns for investors and which . . . are
under enormous pressure to [be] invest[ed].”69
Second, poor economic conditions mean that funds have had trouble
finding outlets for their investment, such as companies to buy for later
resale.70  Funds are also having trouble successfully exiting their invest-
ments in portfolio companies via IPOs.71  When the “IPO market shuts
down, it becomes much harder to return money to investors, which then
means it becomes harder for investors to write [checks] for new funds.”72
As a result, funds have had to increase the timeline required for investing
strategies and have had to delay purchases to the detriment of investing
available funds sooner.  As investors wait longer to see returns, or come
across increasing amounts of investments sitting idly by, funds may see an
uptick of investor suits.  Such suits make an increasingly attractive option
for investors looking to recoup some of their investment.  Indeed, even if
an investor is disinclined to sue—because she is generally optimistic for
the long-term health of a fund, or because she is reticent to antagonize
repeat business partners or future partners—that investor may, nonethe-
less, need to sue if her other investments turn sour.
Even if investors do not sue, the more prolonged an investment is the
greater the likelihood that the investor will sell her limited partnership
interest.  The purchasing investor may not be so reticent to sue, and every
67. Henny Sender, TPG Co-founder Warns on Returns, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2012,
10:01 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77e03df8-07a9-11e2-8354-00144feabdc0.html.
68. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 33 (dry powder levels are estimated at $376
billion or higher as of mid-November  2011).
69. Id. at 2 (“The continued slow growth of the economy limits the number of poten-
tially lucrative targets—increasing the competition for and the price of the more attractive
companies. Overpaying for a portfolio company at purchase can sharply reduce returns at
exit. Some private equity firms are sitting on high levels of committed funds (so-called ‘dry
powder’), which they have not been able to put to work earning returns for investors and
which they are under pressure to invest. Many have been unable to exit their portfolio firms
without incurring losses or lower than anticipated returns. Unable to sell mature investments
to the market—either through an initial public offering (IPO) on a stock exchange or as a
strategic purchase by another company, PE firms are increasingly selling portfolio companies
to other private equity firms. As a result of these challenges, some PE firms are having diffi-
culty attracting limited partners and raising new funds and have sought greater participation
by hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds”).
70. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 32 (“the recession has made it difficult to
find opportunities for investment,. . .private equity funds continue to have large amounts of
‘dry powder’,” and there is “a dearth of promising target companies in a slowly growing
economy.”).
71. Id. at 33.
72. Sender, supra note 67.
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time someone buys or sells a security that investor can now meet the trans-
actional requirements of the Daou test73 (specifically, factors three, four,
and five described above and assuming proof of fraud).  Furthermore, the
longer investors must wait, the longer a class period potentially gets, in-
creasing plaintiffs’ firms’ opportunities to conduct “event studies.”74
Third, private equity funds, in response to these economic problems,75
are taking on new clients—especially hedge funds and sovereign wealth
funds.76  These clients typically demand more control over their invest-
ments, are better informed, and are better able to bring suit (as well as
possibly less reticent to do so).77  According to Applebaum and Batt,
these funds have made a “dramatic shift from [being] indirect and passive
investors to direct and proactive ones,” including in private equity funds.78
These new investors have more clout in demanding disclosure, control,
73. See In re Daou Sys. Inc., 411 F.3d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2005).
74. Spindler, supra note 48, at 363 (“Rule 10b-5 and Section 10b of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 make actionable material misstatements or omissions in the sale or
purchase of securities, with a private right of action granted to investors by the Supreme
Court in 1971 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. Subsequent developments
of legal doctrine allow multiple plaintiff claims to be aggregated into class actions, and, as
implemented in the Supreme Court case of Basic v. Levinson in 1988, the efficient capital
markets hypothesis creates a market test for the non-scienter elements of fraud (causation,
reliance, materiality, and damages). This market test is whether a change in stock price oc-
curred at the time that information reached the market that corrected the misstatement or
omission. That is, making out a 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market class action is largely a matter of
conducting an event study on stock price movement around the time that the market learned
of the fraud.”).
75. Though fundraising by private equity funds did climb in 2012. Hillary Canada, U.S.
Fundraising Climbed in 2012, No Matter What Bad Things People Said About Bain Capital,
WALL ST. J.: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (Jan. 7, 2013, 4:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/private
equity/2013/01/07/u-s-fundraising-climbed-in-2012-no-matter-what-bad-things-people-said-
about-bain-capital/?mod=WSJBlog.
76. Especially as they lose some traditional investment funds, such as pension funds—
as, for example, happened when the “Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System
(OMERS) recently sold a large portfolio of 11 private equity fund investments to AXA Pri-
vate Equity for $850-million. . . . OMERS Private Equity chief executive officer Paul Renaud
said the sale is part of a broader strategy to invest directly in private assets rather than
through investment funds.” Leo Kolivakis, Private Equity Giants Adapting to New Normal?,
PENSION PULSE (July 13, 2012), http://pensionpulse.blogspot.com/2012/07/private-equity-gi-
ants-adapting-to-new.html.
77. See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 31, 34.
78. Id. at 31 (“In recent years, sovereign wealth funds have shifted from low-risk strat-
egies to higher-risk/higher-return investment choices and are now employing a higher-risk/
higher return strategy (Weiss 2008). In addition, dissatisfied with fund performance during
the financial crisis, sovereign wealth funds are undertaking a dramatic shift from indirect and
passive investors to direct and proactive ones. Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), for exam-
ple, was given a seat on the board or represented at the director level for its investment in
Veolia Environment and in Harrods (Monitor 2011). Recently sovereign wealth funds have
begun to take minority ownership stakes in the private equity firms themselves. The Abu
Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), for example, bought a 9 percent stake in Apollo Man-
agement and a 7.5 percent stake in the Carlyle Group. More recently, the Kuwait Investment
Authority and the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation have gained a 5 per-
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and avenues for investment exit, and consequently make ideal clients for
plaintiffs’ firms (which should actively court them).79
Beyond increased liability, which accompanies any new client, espe-
cially this type of client, private equity funds face added liability risks due
to the nature of their client-fund relationship.  The novel type of investing
relationship that funds have with clients imposes liability.  These relation-
ships expose funds to new types of risks and opportunities to commit
fraud. For example, as private equity funds seek new clients and invest-
ment opportunities they increasingly expose themselves to the conspiracy
(and bid-rigging) charges that have entangled private equity funds and
traditional Wall Street firms alike.80
Second, as private equity funds, hedge funds, and sovereign wealth
funds are “increasingly incorporated into large multi-purpose asset man-
agement firms” and “the distinctions among them . . . blur,”81 opportuni-
ties by plaintiffs to forum shop will increase.  This is because civil suits may
be brought in any district “wherein any act or transaction constituting the
violation occurred” or “wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant
or transacts business.”82  Plaintiffs’ firms already have wide latitude in de-
ciding where to bring suit; arguably, this latitude will increase as funds
take on newer clients.  Section 27 of the Exchange Act facilitates bringing
suit by providing for nationwide service of process for claims of violations
of federal securities law.83  Furthermore, the ability to name multiple de-
fendants as securities laws violators, who are liable as co-conspirators,
gives plaintiffs “considerable room for choice in selecting a forum” be-
cause the “venue in that district is extended to cover the other defendants,
even in the absence of any contact or substantial contact by any of the
cent stake in TPG (Zuckerman 2011), and China Development Bank is seeking a minority
stake in TPG (Sender 2011)”).
79. Hedge funds may not be as disinclined to sue large market participants as other
investors are thought to. See Spindler, supra note 1, at 330 (“Many of the investors are repeat
players, such as funds-of-funds, insurance companies, pensions, and other institutional inves-
tors, and do not want to acquire reputations as troublemakers, which would deny them in-
vestment opportunities in the future”). The hedge fund Baupost, for example, thought to
have backed out of mortgage backed securities related litigation, in fact continues to actively
pursue its claims against Bank of America and Countrywide. Alison Frankel, Baupost Hedge
Fund Files Hot Put-back Complaint vs Bear Stearns, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2012), http://
blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2012/09/12/baupost-hedge-fund-files-hot-put-back-com-
plaint-vs-bear-stearns/.
80. See Liz Hoffman, PE Titans Try Again to Whittle LBO Bid-Rigging Claims,
LAW360 (July 24, 2012 3:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/363124; see also RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009).
81. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 33-34.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988); see Bourassa v. Desrochers, 938 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991).
83. Bourassa, 938 F.2d  at 1057.
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other defendants within that district.”84  Increased partnerships with other
funds and investment banks will increase the ability of plaintiffs’ firms to
file multidefendant complaints and choose their venue.
The search for yield has already pushed funds to hazard riskier prac-
tices85—plaintiffs’ firms should recognize the opportunity, and private eq-
uity the litigation risk, therein.
C. Flirting with Public Status: Increased Public Market Entry Exposes
Funds to the Securities Laws they Were Designed to Avoid
Because the Exchange Act empowers the SEC to monitor publically
traded firms,86 and because plaintiffs base 10b-5 suits on disclosures made
to the SEC pursuant to that monitoring,87 the more private equity funds
enter—and linger in or fail to exit—public markets, the more they expose
themselves to investor suits.
Private equity funds expose themselves to public markets in four ways.
First, they can “go public” themselves, “by selling a small percentage of
their management firms to outside investors.”88  Second, sometimes pri-
vate equity funds sell corporations “to another corporation for either cash
or shares in the new company.”89  Third, funds invest in public companies,
without immediately or fully taking those companies private (to later sell
them privately or through an IPO).90  Finally, private equity funds may
84. F. Hodge O’Neal and Ronald R. Janke, Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for Remedying
Squeeze-Outs or Oppression of Minority Shareholders, 16 B.C. INDUS. AND COM. L. REV.
327, 344-45 (1975), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol16/iss3/1.
85. See, e.g., Investors fight over “B+” bonds at 5.75%, SOBER LOOK (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://soberlook.com/2012/09/investors-cant-get-enough-of-b-bonds-at.html.
86. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 5 (internal citations omitted); see generally
Part I.
87. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 24, 35-37 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The
falsely inflated earnings figures that resulted from these improper practices were then used in
[Defendant]’s filings with the SEC during the class period and in company press releases
announcing quarterly results.”); see also Part I.
88. Stephen F. Diamond, Beyond the Berle and Means Paradigm: Private Equity and
the New Capitalist Order, in THE EMBEDDED FIRM CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, LABOR, AND
FINANCE CAPITALISM 151, 152 (Cynthia A. Williams & Peer Zumbansen eds., 2011), availa-
ble at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/56/.
89. Id. at 162.
90. See Helia Ebrahimi, Private Equity’s Purgatory May Feel Like Hell, SOBER LOOK
(Feb. 12, 2010, 10:07PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/
privateequity/7224357/Private-equitys-purgatory-may-feel-like-hell.html (“Private equity
owners failure to exit the companies could leave them nursing a major headache just as they
hoped the sector was showing signs of recovery after one of the darkest passages in its his-
tory. Most will sit in a kind of IPO purgatory and hope that conditions improve enough to
give them a second chance [to exit their investments through sales].”).
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incorporate into large multi-purpose asset management firms,91 blurring
their private and public roles.92
Selling a company in an IPO is increasingly attractive because: funds
are strapped for capital (as discussed above); IPOs can be structured in
ways that allow a fund to raise capital while ceding little control (e.g. Class
B shares with limited or no voting rights sold while Class A shares are
quoted but not traded);93 and funds can use debt to pay dividends to pri-
vate investors, then take a company public and not pay dividends.94
Entering and exiting investments are the toughest challenges facing
private equity.95  And, if Facebook is a harbinger,96 increased exposure to
public markets is a dicey proposition, especially with increased public en-
forcement scrutiny (see below) focused on private equity.
Like a hermit crab that must expose itself every time it moves from
one shell to the next, private equity funds expose themselves to litigation
risk every time they enter the public markets (to enter and exit invest-
ments), where they face increased scrutiny and disclosure requirements
(not to mention financial risk).  Private equity funds are not only more
active in public markets, they are experimenting with novel organizations
such as multi-purpose asset management firms; the increased disclosure
91. See, e.g., Litwin v. Blackstone Grp., L.P., 634 F.3d 706 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 242, 181 L. Ed. 2d 138 (2011).
92. See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 34 (“[A]s private equity, hedge funds,
and sovereign wealth funds are increasingly incorporated into large multi-purpose asset man-
agement firms, the distinctions among them have begun to blur. PE invests in publicly-traded
enterprises; hedge funds buy the distressed debt of PE-owned portfolio companies; while
sovereign wealth funds take on the limited partner role and invest in PE funds.”).
93. Daniel Stanton & Fiona Lau, Manchester United drops Asia IPO for U.S.,
REUTERS (June 13, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/13/us-singapore-
us-ipo-manchester-united-if-idUSBRE85C0MO20120613.
94. See Dan Primack, AutoTrader: Dividends for us, not for you, CNN MONEY (June
18, 2012, 3:28 PM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/06/18/autotrader-dividends-for-us-
not-for-you/; see also APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 21 (describing the HCA case:
“The PE owners attempted to exit the deal in 2010 with an IPO, but, when the market did
not allow them to, they paid themselves $4.25 billion in a series of dividend recapitaliza-
tions—in part by issuing junk bonds and loading the company with additional debt. Such
dividend recapitalizations appear to contradict the argument that PE returns come from
building value in portfolio companies and derive from the difference between the price PE
paid to acquire the company and the price at which it sells when it exits the investment. In
March, 2011, HCA was finally successful in going public, with a $3.8 billion IPO. While the
owners more than recouped their initial investment, HCA is now saddled with $26 billion in
debt—$12 billion more than the company’s assets.”) (citations omitted).
95. See Hillary Canada, Survey Says: Entering And Exiting Are Toughest Challenges In
PE, WALL ST. J.: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (Oct. 25, 2012, 3:26 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/pri-
vateequity/2012/10/25/survey-says-entering-and-exiting-are-toughest-challenges-in-pe/?mod=
WSJBlog.
96. See Aaron Smith, Investors sue Facebook, Morgan Stanley, CNN MONEY (May 23,
2012, May 2:48 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/23/technology/facebook-lawsuit/index.
htm.
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required to be active in public markets, and exposure to more clients in-
creases funds’ exposure to investor suits as well.
D. Dodd-Frank Act disclosure requirements
New Dodd-Frank disclosure and registration requirements make it eas-
ier for investor suits to adequately plead the threshold requirements nec-
essary to get to discovery, and easier to get to settlement as well.97  Title
IV of the Dodd-Frank Act includes the Private Fund Investment Advisers
Registration Act of 2010 (the Registration Act), which directly regulates
private equity.98  The recordkeeping and reporting obligations imposed by
Dodd-Frank will provide investors with more information on which to
base suits.  This section first examines how the Dodd-Frank regulates pri-
vate equity funds by asset size and number of shareholders, then looks at
how investors can use the disclosures required under those regulations to
draft a 10b-5 complaint.
The size of a private equity fund will play the most important role in
determining how much disclosure and other regulation a fund faces.  Pri-
vate equity funds with $2 billion or more in assets have the highest report-
ing requirements.  About 155 private-equity fund advisers fall into this
category.99  Comparatively, a modest number of funds100 having just $25
million in assets or less are not required to register at the federal level.101
Under the Registration Act, funds with $25 million in assets or less must
instead register only with state regulators.102  The Registration Act
97. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 62, at 214-15.
98. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 7.
99. Id.
100. Though I have been unable to find statistics on the number of private equity funds
with under $25 million in assets, the number is apparently quite small: “Unless the SEC, by
rulemaking, significantly increases the $25 million threshold . . . [the] exemption for this
purpose is fairly narrow, and will limit the ability of non-U.S. advisers to raise significant
funds in the United States without first registering as investment advisers.”  Heather Cruz,
Private Fund Investment Advisers, SKADDEN (July 9, 2010), available at http://www.skadden.
com/insights/private-fund-investment-advisers.
101. BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET RE-
FORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 3 (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.bingham.com/
Alerts/2010/10/~/media/Files/Docs/Summary_of_the_Dodd-
Frank_Wall_Street_Reform_and_Consumer_Protection_Act_5859pdf.ashx.  Whether funds
with between $25 and $100 million in assets register with the SEC is less straightforward.  As
Bingham McCutchen explain: “The Act, however, provides that an adviser that (a) is re-
quired to be registered in the state in which it maintains its principal office and place of
business, (b) if registered, would be subject to examination by such state and (c) has assets
under management between $25 million and $100 million, MAY NOT register with the SEC,
unless it otherwise would be required to register with 15 or more states or is an adviser to an
investment company registered under the 1940 Act, or any entity electing to be treated as a
business development company under the 1940 Act.” Id. at 4.
102. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT AD-
VISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 8-9 (2012), available at http://
www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf.
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amended § 203(b)(3)103 of the Advisers Act so that private equity funds
with more than $150 million in assets “are no longer exempt from. . .SEC
registration, recordkeeping, and reporting obligations.”104  Private equity
funds with more than $150 million in assets were required to register with
the SEC by March 2012.105  Funds that register with the SEC are required
to:
• maintain such records and file such reports with the SEC regarding
Private Funds advised by the investment adviser as the SEC deems
“necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protec-
tion of investors”;
• provide the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “Council”)
with the data necessary to monitor systemic risk issues;
• maintain the following records with respect to the Private Funds
they advise:
° the amount of assets under management and use of leverage (in-
cluding off-balance sheet leverage);
° counterparty credit risk exposure;
° trading and investment positions;
° valuation policies and practices of the fund;
° types of assets held;
° side arrangements or side letters providing favorable terms for cer-
tain investors;
° trading practices; and
° all other information that the SEC determines, in consultation
with the Council, to be “necessary and appropriate in the public
interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of
systemic risk”; and
• be subject to SEC examinations to be determined by the SEC.106
This list is a minimum; larger funds will have to disclose even more infor-
mation.  These measures have already required “more than 750 advisers to
disclose information about their investors and employees, the assets they
manage, as well as any perceived conflicts of interest and activities outside
of advising funds.”107
103. See BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, supra note 101.
104. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 7.
105. Id.
106. Bingham McCutchen LLP, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion Act - A Summary, PRACTICING LAW INST., at 2-3 (2010); see also APPELBAUM & BATT,
supra note 10, at 7 (“Reporting requirements include basic organizational and operational
information on each fund managed; the size and ownership of each fund; nature of services;
types of clients; employees; advisory and non-advisory activities; and potential conflicts of
interest. . . .”).
107. SEC Registration, PRIVATE EQUITY GROWTH CAPITAL COUNCIL, http://www.
pegcc.org/issues/the-dodd-frank-act-summary/private-equity-sec-registration/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2013).
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Private equity funds face regulations according to the number of share-
holders they have investing in the fund, as well.  The JOBS Act, however,
relaxes these regulations, raising the shareholder limit for triggering public
company status under the Exchange Act to 2,000 investors overall (i.e.
accredited and non-accredited), and excluding from that number share-
holders who received the securities under an employee compensation plan
exempted from registration.108  This latter provision, in particular,
“promises to [substantially] delay the point at which a growing company
would be forced to make the periodic disclosures required of public
companies.”109
Because investor suits frequently begin as “event studies”—plaintiffs’
lawyers look for large drops in stock price, then match the date of those
drops to preceding statements they allege to be fraudulent110—increased
disclosure provides litigants with more statements (such as those made in
10-Qs) to match to stock movement.111
Disclosure also provides more information that can be used to estab-
lish scienter.  Plaintiffs can indicate scienter in many ways, including from
facts demonstrating falsity (the same facts relied on in event studies).  Be-
cause “falsity and scienter in private securities fraud cases are generally
strongly inferred from the same set of facts . . . the two requirements may
be combined into a unitary inquiry under the [Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”112)].”113  This allows scienter to be in-
ferred, at least in part, from the falsity of statements—especially the re-
quired statements made in 10-Ks and 10-Qs.  The most direct way to show
both falsity and scienter is via contemporaneous reports or data available
to the party that contradict those statements.114  The more statements that
108. Pritchard, supra note 55, at 15-16 (paraphrasing JOBS Act §§ 501-02).
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990) (“The story in
this complaint is familiar in securities litigation. At one time the firm bathes itself in a
favorable light. Later the firm discloses that things are less rosy. The plaintiff contends that
the difference must be attributable to fraud.”).
111. See John E. Schreiber & Ian C. Eisner, The Piggyback Strike Suit, L.A. DAILY
JOURNAL, (July 25, 2012), http://www.dailyjournal.com/public/pubmain.cfm?logout=& selop-
tion=&eid=&vid=&CFID=1205149&CFTOKEN=60934684. See also Spindler, supra note
48, at 363 (“[The] market test is whether a change in stock price occurred at the time that
information reached the market that corrected the misstatement or omission. (citation omit-
ted). That is, making out a 10b-5 fraud-on-the-market class action is largely a matter of con-
ducting an event study on stock price movement around the time that the market learned of
the fraud.”).
112. “The PSLRA was passed to redress certain perceived abuses in securities litigation
including ‘the abuse of the discovery process to coerce settlement,’” especially by raising the
pleading requirements for securities plaintiffs.  Seippel v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood
LLP, No. 03 Civ. 6942 (SAS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2388, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2005)
(quoting In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 530-31 (3d Cir. 1999)).
113. See In re Daou Sys. Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005).
114. Nursing Home Pension Fund, Local 144 v. Oracle Corp., 380 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th
Cir. 2004).
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plaintiffs can match to market data (i.e. stock price movement), the easier
it is for plaintiffs to meet the threshold showing they need to get to discov-
ery—which more often than not ends in settlement.115
With the number of private equity funds and advisers registering al-
ready climbing, increased transparency is a fact of life for most funds (the
JOBS Act notwithstanding).  Disclosure, in turn, exposes private equity
funds to public enforcement and the private suits that “piggyback” off of
public enforcement—the subject of the next sub-section.
E. SEC Enforcement Aids 10b-5 Plaintiffs and Hinders Defenses
Increased attention from the SEC will make it easier for investors to
bring 10b-5 suits against private equity funds because investors will have
more opportunities to bring suits that “piggyback”116 off SEC enforce-
ment.117  The same is true for any criminal referrals the SEC makes to the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”).118  Where civil or criminal charges make
it successfully through court, investors will likewise bring more effective
suits against funds, because defendant funds will be collaterally estopped
from denying admissions they already plead to or criminal violations for
which they have already been convicted.
SEC enforcement of private equity funds is increasing for several rea-
sons.  First, Dodd-Frank requires private equity funds to register with the
SEC.  Second, there is increased regulatory will to target private equity.
For example, as Pete Brush states, the SEC recently “fired a shot across
the [private equity] industry’s bow,” promising more enforcement target-
ing the camera-shy industry.119  Lastly, disclosure requirements will im-
115. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 62, at 214-15; see also Victor D. Quintanilla,
(Mis)judging Intent: The Fundamental Attribution Error in Federal Securities Law, 7 N.Y.U.
J. L. & BUS. 195, 216-17 (2010) (“As an empirical matter, however, denial of summary judg-
ment results not in trial, but settlement whether or not defendants are culpable. Trials are
exceedingly infrequent. For example, the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse reported that approximately 3,052 federal securities class actions were filed
between January 1, 1996 and December 21, 2009. During that time only fifteen (15) federal
securities class action cases were tried to verdict—one half of one percent of total cases
filed.”) (internal citations omitted).
116. See Schreiber & Eisner, supra note 111; CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 62, at 769.
117. See, e.g., In re Qwest Commc’ns Int’l Inc., 450 F.3d 1179, 1192 (10th Cir. 2006) (in
which private plaintiffs were able to obtain through discovery documents produced to the
SEC that constituted waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine).
118. “The Securities Act and The Exchange Act “explicitly empower[s] the SEC to in-
vestigate possible infractions of the securities laws with a view to both civil and criminal
enforcement, and to transmit the fruits of its investigations to [the Department of] Justice in
the event of potential criminal proceedings. . . . Under the same subsection of the ‘34 Act the
SEC may ‘transmit such evidence as may be available concerning such acts or practices * * *
to the Attorney General, who may, in his discretion, institute the necessary criminal proceed-
ings under this chapter.’ The ‘33 Act is to similar effect.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dresser
Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1376-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted).
119. Brush, supra note 51 (“‘There will be more private equity cases coming from the
division of enforcement in coming years than there have been previously,’ Kaplan [co-chief
of the SEC’s asset management unit] said”).
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prove SEC targeting and will translate into more and more effective
enforcement.  This is part of a normal phenomenon where “companies
and their lawyers spend considerable energy avoiding public status . . . .
[Such] regulatory arbitrage . . . in turn induce[s] the SEC to spend like
effort in curtailing those attempted evasions of public status.”120  Having
now registered with the SEC, funds can expect increasing scrutiny.121
Where limited partners are kept in the dark, they may have no way of
knowing that a private equity fund general partner has engaged in fraud.
A public enforcement action alerts investors not only to the fraud, but also
to the high chance of winning (since the SEC naturally tends to prefer to
bring strong cases) if they were to bring a claim against the fund.  Indeed,
even where the SEC abandons an enforcement action, private litigants
may nevertheless proceed with their claim.122
Plaintiffs base suits on enforcement actions, even when the SEC ulti-
mately abandons them.  Even where investors are aware of fraud, and in-
tend to bring a 10b-5 without a parallel SEC action, they can benefit by
obtaining the documents provided to the SEC as part of the Commission’s
investigation.  Private suit plaintiffs can subpoena public documents (e.g.
Wells Submissions, disclosure made by registered entities, such as 10-Ks
and 10-Qs, and discovery documents from trial) for evidence that defend-
ants have previously made available to government agents.123  And, as
Bain Capital recently learned, “[t]here is a well-established common-law
presumption of public access to judicial documents.”124  Sometimes the
SEC will even make documents available to private litigants without a
subpoena.
Just as greater disclosure requirements lead to greater frequency for
10b-5 claims, because the disclosed material makes such claims easier to
bring, so too can documents obtained through public investigations and
discovery aid subsequent suits filed under 10b-5 claims.
Less common, but incredibly damaging to any defendant, is the threat
that a SEC enforcement action can lead to a referral to the DOJ for crimi-
nal prosecution (usually a stay is put on the parallel civil case).  Criminal
prosecutions are not only dangerous in their own right, they may also in-
crease civil liability, as defendants who plead guilty to, or are convicted of,
120. Pritchard, supra note 55, at 6.
121. Laura Kreutzer, Putting Dodd-Frank to the Test: Is Private Equity Ready?, WALL
ST. J: PRIVATE EQUITY BEAT (Aug. 28, 2012, 11:20 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/privateequity/
2012/08/28/putting-dodd-frank-to-the-test-is-private-equity-ready/?mod=WSJBlog.
122. See, e.g., Sawant v. Ramsey, No. 307-cv-980, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102899 (D.
Conn. Sept. 28, 2010).
123. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 62, at 768-69. But see id. at 214-15 (“Private par-
ties cannot directly free ride on the SEC’s investigative efforts—§ 21(g) of the Exchange Act
requires SEC permission for any private action to be consolidated with an SEC injunctive
action and such permission will rarely be granted.”).
124. Dahl v. Bain Capital Partners, Civ.A. 07-12388-EFH, 2012 WL 4045194 (D. Mass.
Sept. 14, 2012) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408
(1st Cir. 1987)).
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a criminal count are “collaterally estopped” from challenging a related
civil suit (i.e. a fund or manager cannot disclaim liability in a civil suit
when s/he/it has already pleaded guilty to a criminal action involving the
same actus reus and mens rea).125
The particularly good news for plaintiffs’ firms that might seek to take
advantage of public enforcement targeting private equity funds is that the
SEC plans to focus on insider trading and conflicts of interest.126  Because
Dodd-Frank will “significantly increase the number of private equity firms
subject to SEC regulation as ‘investment advisers,’ private equity firms
must [create] written policies and procedures reasonably designed to pre-
vent violation of the federal securities laws.”127  The SEC has promised to
use this requirement to examine private equity funds that may engage in
insider trading and conflict of interest violations of the securities laws.128
And while a bevy of enforcement actions targeting private equity funds
have yet to materialize, the SEC did send letters in late 2011 “to a number
of private equity firms in the U.S. notifying them that they were subject of
an informal inquiry into how they value the private companies in which
they invest.”129
With the SEC recently setting its sights on insider trading violations,
the most difficult element of a 10b-5 claim to prove just got much easier.
The most difficult element in a 10b-5 suit to specifically130 allege is usually
scienter.131  Plaintiffs will frequently have a statement made by a private
equity fund, along with some evidence they claim shows that the statement
is false.  Indeed, they may even have evidence that the maker of the state-
ment knew the statement to be false.  Even with solid evidence as to fal-
sity, however, plaintiffs will find it difficult to allege a motive.  Although a
125. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Gordon, 822 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1157 (N.D. Okla.
2011) (Defendants criminally convicted for “pump and dump” securities fraud scheme collat-
erally estopped from challenging civil violations of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5); see also In re Bilzerian), 153 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. Fla. 1998) (citing Mun. of
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, 547 F. Supp. 633, 644 (D. Alaska 1982) (“[defendant]’s pleas of
guilty to the mail and wire fraud counts estop it from denying that it engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity”)).
126. SEC Enforcement to Focus on Private Equity Insider Trading and Conflicts of In-




129. Levine, supra note 11.
130. Because 10b-5 suits are based in fraud, the higher pleading standard of Rule 9 (i.e.
“particularity”) is required at the pleading stage, rather than Rule 8’s lower standard (i.e. “a
short and plain statement of the claim”). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and 9(b).
131. C.f. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs I), 551 U.S. 308, 325
(2007) (“While it is true that motive can be a relevant consideration, and personal financial
gain may weigh heavily in favor of a scienter inference, we agree with the Seventh Circuit
that the absence of a motive allegation is not fatal. . . . [A]llegations must be considered
collectively; the significance that can be ascribed to an allegation of motive, or lack thereof,
depends on the entirety of the complaint.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-2\MPE204.txt unknown Seq: 23 10-JUN-13 12:55
Spring 2013] Private Equity & Private Suits 293
motive is not required,132 courts frequently dismiss cases for failure to
state a claim or grant summary judgment in cases lacking one.133  Insider
selling—where senior managers make public statement to inflate the value
of their companies stock while selling their own shares—is the easiest way
to allege a motive (and win the sympathy of the court)—because there the
profit motive is clear.134  With the SEC increasingly investigating the types
of violations that 10b-5 suits can most easily “piggyback” off of—indeed,
that are likely to yield to private suits the evidence most difficult for them
to allege and so survive a motion to dismiss—investors should have an
increasingly easy time bringing parallel suits.
And, increased SEC attention is not the only enforcement threat facing
the private equity industry.  Private equity funds may also be beginning to
make an appearance in FCPA actions,135 and they may find themselves
the subject of state prosecutions as well (with New York Attorney General
Schneiderman leading the way136).
With the above regulatory attention, plaintiffs’ firms may find that gov-
ernment agencies have already done much of the work investigating de-
fendant funds for them.  Though the SEC, when bringing an enforcement
action, is not required to make some of the showings that a 10b-5 claimant
must (e.g. the SEC is not bound by geography, as 10b-5 litigants are by
Morrison,137 and does not need to show reliance138), the SEC does need
to establish some of the same factors (e.g. scienter139).  And the easier
(and cheaper, because investigating fraud and preparing a complaint costs
money) 10b-5 suits are to bring, the more the suits private equity industry
will face.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., In re Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that despite sales of $84 million in shares, the defendants still retained such a large percent-
age of their holdings—92 percent—that an inference of scienter was functionally negated);
See also In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (no scienter where despite over
$13.8 million in stock sales, the defendants still retained over 90 percent of their holdings).
134. See, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Greebel
v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Unusual trading or trading at suspi-
cious times or in suspicious amounts by corporate insiders has long been recognized as pro-
bative of scienter”)); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1994).
135. See Singer, supra note 50, at 293.
136. Nicholas Confessore et al., Financial Firms Face Subpoenas on Tax Strategy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/02/business/inquiry-
on-tax-strategy-adds-to-scrutiny-of-finance-firms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
137. See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
138. See SEC v. True N. Fin. Corp., Civ. 10-3995 DWF/JJK, 2012 WL 5471063 (D. Minn.
Nov. 9, 2012).
139. An action brought by the SEC pursuant to §17(a)(1) of the Securities Act (which
makes it unlawful to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud), for example, requires
the SEC to show scienter (though §17(a)(2) and §17(a)(3) do not). Aaron v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 697 (1980).
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F. Brave New World: An Opportunity for Plaintiffs’ Firms
Private equity, which has long operated in the regulatory shadows,140
is in need of private market discipline.141  Plaintiffs’ firms, which are fac-
ing decreasing returns in traditional areas of litigation,142 should take ad-
vantage of increased regulatory and market vulnerability to act as private
attorney generals and impose that private discipline.  Because plaintiffs’
firms cannot bring 10b-5 suits unless they have an investor-client directly
harmed by an alleged fraud, plaintiffs’ firms should begin by courting new
clients.  Private equity limited partners, including the new types of inves-
tors in the private equity investment market such as hedge funds and sov-
ereign wealth funds, present a great opportunity to do just that.
Inevitably, whatever steps plaintiffs’ firms take against private equity
funds on behalf of investors, private equity will try to avoid the increased
liability in two ways: by working harder to avoid such suits or by working
to prevent them.
Private equity funds avoid investor suits in two principal ways: (1) by
staying small143 (indeed, private equity is designed to avoid regulation by
having the fund, which represents a collective of investors, count as a sin-
140. There is clear evidence that the strategies employed by some private equity funds
have perverse market effects. See, e.g., APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 15-16 (high-
lighting the bankrupting of Mervyn’s, which put 18,000 employees out of work).
141. Private equity funds have not made good targets of 10b-5 class action and deriva-
tive suits in the past. See, e.g., Tom Hals, Delaware Judge Seeks Details of Novel Litigation
Finance Deal, THOMSON REUTERS: SECURITIES LAW (July 26, 2012), http://newsandin-
sight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/News/2012/07_-_July/Dela-
ware_judge_seeks_details_of_novel_litigation_finance_deal/.
142. 2011 saw the lowest number of approved settlements (by number and by dollar
amount) in more than 10 years. ELLEN M. RYAN & LAURA E. SIMMONS, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION SETTLEMENTS: 2011 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 1 (2011), available at http://
www.cornerstone.com/files/News/85d21ef6-25ff-45d0-8147-b6e69dfd7115/Presentation/News
Attachment/6d6e4c44-93a5-4616-8ba1-0e7e6ce519f8/Cornerstone_Research_Settlements_
2011_Analysis.pdf. Cornerstone’s mid-year report for 2012 finds: “There were 88 filings in
the first six months of 2012, down 6 percent from both the first half and second half of 2011.
If current trends hold, there will be 176 filings in 2012 by year-end, less than the 1997 to 2011
average of 193 but in line with the 2009 to 2011 average of 177.” CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,




143. Pritchard, supra note 55, at 9 (“Smaller companies, for which the opportunities for
fraud and manipulation are most prevalent, remained largely unregulated”). Note that cur-
rently, under the new Dodd-Frank rules, 155 private equity funds are subject to Dodd-
Frank’s higher disclosures for large funds. Carla Main, Hedge Fund Secrets, Bank Capital
Deadline, Gupta: Compliance, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/
news/2011-10-27/hedge-fund-secrets-bank-capital-deadline-gupta-compliance.html. But see
Kail Jethmalani, Regulatory Oversight in Private Equity:  A One Way Street to Economic
Inefficiency, MICH. J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAP. L.:  MJPVL BLOG (Oct. 23,
2012, 8:51 AM), http://mjpvl.org/blog/regulatory_oversight_in_private_equity1 (describing
how the SEC may be targeting smaller funds, to the exclusion of enforcement against larger
funds).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-2\MPE204.txt unknown Seq: 25 10-JUN-13 12:55
Spring 2013] Private Equity & Private Suits 295
gle shareholder144), and, relatedly, (2) by using the JOBS Act to skirt reg-
ulation.  As Pritchard explains,
JOBS Act reforms have the potential to create a lower tier of public compa-
nies, thus blurring the line between public and private. These changes have
been roundly criticized by advocates for investor protection, however, as
opening the door wide for fraud and manipulation.  Those criticisms carry
some weight, given the abuses that repeatedly occur in the penny-stock
market.145
There are other ways to blur the line between public and private, for ex-
ample by: selling two classes of security146—especially if at least one of
those classes are sold abroad;147 or “using swaps to hedge currency or in-
terest rate risk” in order to fall within certain de minimis exemptions.148
Private equity’s world is changing.  The literature on private equity can
no longer ignore the impact of securities laws,149 and suits may, will, and
should proliferate.  For private equity funds, these developments should
serve as a wake up alarm.  And so preventing suits—or at least having
them dismissed pre-discovery—is the subject of the next section.
III. (OVER)ZEALOUS GATEKEEPING: CAN PRIVATE EQUITY TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF JUDICIAL BARRIERS TO INVESTOR SUITS?
The number of pre-discovery motions to dismiss in securities arbitration has
increased dramatically over the last few years.  From 1996 to 2001, motions
filed by respondents in arbitration proceedings quadrupled.  This increase
was not justified by a “corresponding increase in arbitration claims.”  In
2006, only 18% of arbitration claims were decided after a hearing on the
merits . . . As motion practices have increased, awards to individuals have
decreased.  The percentage of cases where customer claimants were awarded
damages has decreased every year since 2001.  Whereas, the majority of cus-
tomer dispute claims use to end in the customer’s favor, customers were
only awarded damages in 42% of the cases closed in 2006.150
144. Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 19, at 25-26 (“Since its inception, Rule 12g5-1
has said that securities held of record by a corporation, partnership, trust or other organiza-
tion shall be counted as one record owner.  Indeed many institutional investors are collec-
tives of individual economic investors—e.g., mutual funds, private equity and venture capital
funds, many of which invest in pre-IPO companies—and there has been little question that
their ownership interest is that of a single shareholder.”).
145. Pritchard, supra note 55, at 4.
146. Stanton & Lau, supra note 93.
147. Lyle Roberts, Made in America, 10B-5 DAILY (Aug. 17, 2012, 11:13 PM), http://
www.the10b-5daily.com/archives/001191.html.
148. Noam Noked, Changes to CFTC Regulations Affecting Private Funds, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Sept. 21, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://blogs.law.harv
ard.edu/corpgov/2012/10/11/changes-to-cftc-regulations-affecting-private-funds/.
149. Spindler, supra note 1, at 312 (“the private-equity literature has paid . . . little
attention to the securities laws.”).
150.  Bridget B. Zoltowski, Restoring Investor Confidence: Providing Uniformity in Se-
curities Arbitration by Offering Guidelines for Arbitrators in Deciding Motions to Dismiss
Before A Hearing on the Merits, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 375, 386 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
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Since 1995, using the PSLRA as cover, some courts, at various levels,
have raised the pleading requirements when bringing a 10b-5 action.151
That trend has accelerated in the last few years under the Roberts Court.
Like suits filed against publicly traded companies, private equity funds will
likely take advantage of these judicially imposed barriers in order to pre-
vent investor suits from moving forward in litigation.
This section discusses the PSLRA of 1995, examines how federal
judges have used the PSLRA as cover to make it increasingly difficult for
investors to move beyond the pleadings stage in 10b-5 suits, and reviews
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence affecting plaintiff investor suits.
Given this context, and the argument that private equity funds face in-
creased 10b-5 liability from private investors, private equity firms will
likely employ two methods to rebut increasing liability suits.  First, private
equity firms will employ the same procedural precedents used by public
companies to convince judges to dismiss cases brought by plaintiff inves-
tors, and, second, firms will increase lobbying efforts (as discussed in Part
IV).
A. The PSLRA
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) was
passed by Congress “to curb perceived abuses of the § 10(b) private ac-
tion—‘nuisance filings, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, vexatious dis-
covery requests and manipulation by class action lawyers.’”152  As a check
against such abusive litigation by private parties, the PSLRA imposes
“[e]xacting legal requirements” that require “plaintiffs to state with partic-
ularity both the facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evi-
dencing scienter, i.e., the defendant’s intention ‘to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.’”153  Though designed to curb abuses, some federal judges have
used the PSLRA as a cover to dismiss even meritorious claims.
151. Quintanilla, supra note 115, at 208 (“Congress also elevated the motion to dismiss
stage to a crucial adjudication point in private federal securities litigation. Section
21D(b)(3)(A) of the PSLRA states that, ‘the court shall, on the motion of any defendant,
dismiss the complaint if the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met.’ Congress
contemplated that federal courts would use the strong inference standard as a means to filter
out unmeritorious federal securities lawsuits. The locus of decision-making shifted to federal
judges. Judges now serve as gatekeepers who screen out complaints, thereby minimizing the
strike value of unfounded allegations and preserving the court’s time and limited resources.
Several empirical studies suggest that the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards have in-
creased the dismissal of unmeritorious suits.”) (footnotes omitted).
152. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs I), 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007)
(citing Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006) (quoting H. R.
Conf. Rep. No. 104-369, p.31 (1995))); Seippel v. Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood LLP, No. 03
Civ. 6942 (SAS), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2388, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2005).
153. Tellabs I, 551 U.S. at 308 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194
(1976)).
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B. Overzealous Gatekeeping: Federal Court Barriers
The increased dismissal of merited claims results in under-enforcement of
the securities laws, which undermines the integrity of American markets.154
Some federal courts have interpreted the PSLRA’s heightened plead-
ing standard in ways that create “access barriers to remedies for securities
fraud victims at the pleading, class-certification, and summary-judgment
stages.”155  As a result of these heightened standards, significantly fewer
securities class actions and derivative suits survive until discovery (let
alone trial—though most securities suits end in settlement if not dis-
missed).156  This section briefly outlines how judges impose heightened
pleading standards for scienter at the motion to dismiss stage, for reliance
and loss causation at the class certification stage, and for expert witnesses
based on faulty notions of credibility at the motion for summary judgment
stage.
Judges have made it more difficult for plaintiff investors to survive mo-
tions to dismiss by requiring a higher scienter than required under legisla-
tion or Supreme Court precedent.157  The PSLRA requires plaintiffs to
“state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the de-
fendant acted with the required state of mind.”158  The required state of
mind is “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.”159  The plaintiff “al-
leging fraud under § 10(b) must plead facts rendering an inference of sci-
enter at least as likely as any plausible opposing inference” (emphasis in
original).160  Because the standard is “at least as likely” circumstantial evi-
dence should be admitted and sufficient for a plaintiff to survive a motion
to dismiss.161  Judges are also supposed to accept all factual statements as
true, consider the complaint in its entirety, and take into account plausible
opposing inferences.162
Courts have nevertheless insisted on a higher standard of scienter from
plaintiffs: “Even though the federal courts have . . . reiterated that mere
154. Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to Reme-
dies for Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 90 (2012).
155. See id. at 70 (“[B]y rewriting rules of procedure rather than deferring to traditional
rulemaking bodies like Congress and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference, the judiciary has usurped the rulemaking function of the legislature. By rewrit-
ing Rule 23 and Rule 56, the judiciary has shown a disregard for the congressional rulemak-
ing process and bucked the historical trend away from unilateral judicial decision-making
toward a process that includes multiple gatekeepers.”) (footnote omitted).
156. Jim Oliphant, Unhappy Investors Increasingly Rejected in Efforts to Sue Public
Companies, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 3, 1999, at A1.
157. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 154, at 55-59 (giving a much fuller treat-
ment of the issue).
158. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (2009).
159. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976).
160. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (Tellabs I), 551 U.S. 308, 311 (2007).
161. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 154 at 55-59.
162. Tellabs I, 551 U.S. at 309.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-2\MPE204.txt unknown Seq: 28 10-JUN-13 12:55
298 Michigan Journal of Private Equity & Venture Capital Law [Vol. 2:271
recklessness is enough to satisfy the pleading standard,” some courts
“have found that the inference of scienter is less likely than virtually any
other non-culpable mental state” (e.g. negligence or belief that undis-
closed information was not material).”163
Judges have also made it harder to obtain class certification:164 “The
courts have rewritten Federal Rule 23 to require plaintiffs to prove to a
judge the merits of the elements of reliance and loss causation by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence to obtain class certification, a burden at least
equal to their burden of proof at trial.”165  Loss causation, is a particularly
problematic element to demonstrate at the class certification stage, be-
cause: (1) “it denies plaintiffs the presumption of reliance in fraud-on-the-
market cases,” as required by the Supreme Court in Basic;166 (2) “loss
causation . . . is a question common to all class members; there can be no
individual issues of loss causation;” and (3) “plaintiffs need not prevail on
the merits to receive class treatment.”167
Finally, some judges have erected barriers to 10b-5 suits by substituting
their own conceptions of what is plausible under the aegis of “credibil-
ity”168—in other words, judges “exclude expert testimony that, on the ba-
sis of their personal scientific expertise, they deem unreliable.”169
Summary judgment is thus converted into “a factual determination of not
just the reliability, but also the credibility of the plaintiffs’ expert on issues
of damages and loss causation.”170  And, because summary judgment is
decided pre-trial it is a judge who makes this factual determination, not a
jury.
Two 10b-5 cases decided by Judge Easterbrook provide excellent ex-
amples of how a judge can prevent a claim from getting to discovery and
jury trial by employing his personal understanding of economic incentives.
In Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, purchasers of bonds and
notes sued a law firm and an accounting firm for violations of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.  Judge Easterbrook upheld the district court’s
grant of summary judgment on the grounds that “[Defendants] billed so
little . . .  that it is inconceivable that they joined a venture to feather their
nests by defrauding investors.171  In DiLeo v. Ernst & Young Judge Eas-
terbrook employed similar reasoning: “An accountant’s greatest asset is its
reputation for honesty . . . Fees for two years’ audits could not approach
163. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 154, at 55-59.
164. See id. at 59-67.
165. Id. at 59.
166. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988) (“[T]he reliance of individual
plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be presumed.”).
167. Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 154, at 64-65.
168. See id. at 67-70.
169. Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Expe-
rience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 662-63 (2010).
170. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 154, at 67.
171. Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MPE\2-2\MPE204.txt unknown Seq: 29 10-JUN-13 12:55
Spring 2013] Private Equity & Private Suits 299
the losses [the auditor] would suffer from a perception that it would muffle
a client’s fraud” so “[i]t would have been irrational for any of them to have
joined [the fraud].”172  In both cases, Judge Easterbrook ignored the evi-
dence presented, as well as obviously plausible explanations (e.g. the firms
assisted in the fraud at hand in order to retain business in the future).
Judge Easterbrook also makes unsupported claims (e.g. how does he know
that “[f]ees for two years’ audits could not approach the losses [the audi-
tor] would suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client’s
fraud”?).  Judge Easterbrook does not consider and dismiss alternate ex-
planations; he finds them inconceivable!173
C. Increased Securities Attention from the Roberts Court
While federal judges at the district and appellate level have stretched
the Supreme Court’s holdings in Tellabs and other cases, the Supreme
Court has, since then, devoted more attention to securities cases.  Mid-
2010 to mid-2012, have been particularly active years for the court, gener-
ating “more United States Supreme Court [securities laws] precedent than
the previous eighteen [years].”174  That precedent includes three key cases
that make 10b-5 suits more difficult to bring:
• Morrison: Held that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not apply extra-
territorially, limiting the ability of 10b-5 plaintiffs to bring suits against a
range of securities offerors, including private equity funds.175  Because
even American private equity funds so frequently operate internation-
ally (45% of investments are made outside of North America176), and
are able to use the corporate form to segregate which business entity
can be responsible for what statement (see Janus below), private equity
funds can avoid 10b-5 liability by operating internationally.
• Janus Capital: Held that the ‘maker’ of a statement is “the person or
entity with ultimate authority over the statement,” limiting the ability of
10b-5 plaintiffs to bring suits not only against lawyers, accountants, and
other professionals who help prepare fraudulent statements, but also
against the parents or subsidiaries of a corporation which do not sign
172. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990).
173. Judge Easterbrook may be “a leading proponent of law and economics analysis”
but previous law and economics thinking on his part has left him in a position to dismiss
other theories based on personal beliefs he has already made as to what is plausible and what
is “inconceivable.” Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral In-
sight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 136 (2000).
174. Paul A. Ferrillo, The Supreme Court’s Recent Focus on 10b-5 Cases, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE AND FIN. REG. (Sept. 21, 2012, 8:42 AM), http://blogs.law.harv
ard.edu/corpgov/2012/09/21/the-supreme-courts-recent-focus-on-10b-5-cases/.
175. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).
176. PRIVATE EQUITY GROWTH CAPITAL COUNCIL, GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION OF PRI-
VATE EQUITY INVESTMENT IN 2011, at 2 (2012), available at http://www.pegcc.org/wordpress/
wp-content/uploads/2011-Geographic-Dispersion-of-PE-Investment.pdf.
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statements or have “ultimate authority” for their dissemination.177  This
holding allows parents and/or subsidiaries of a company to hide behind
the corporate form—a key benefit for private equity firms, who invest in
and control lots of companies, but keep them legally separate from the
private equity fund that operates them.
• Dukes: Held that class certification requires not the lower bar of raising
common questions, but the higher standard that the class-wide proceed-
ing have “the capacity . . . to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation.”178  In addition, Dukes (in dicta) raised the
bar for class certification expert witnesses by implying179 that they need
be subjected to Daubert scrutiny (requiring “scientific community” peer
review for expert testimony to be credible180).181
While not all Roberts Court jurisprudence in the securities arena has
served to make 10b-5 claims more difficult to bring,182 the increased atten-
tion means that funds operate in an environment in flux, increasing the
risk of liability.  What this means for private equity is that while there may
be more suits, plaintiffs face difficulty in getting them to discovery, and
settlement.
IV. PRIVATE EQUITY COMES OF AGE: REGULATORY AVOIDANCE
TO REGULATORY CAPTURE
In the wake of the financial crisis and widespread support for financial re-
form, the [private equity] industry attempted to avoid new regulation
through voluntary self-regulation and extensive lobbying of Congress.183
As the regulatory and economic environment in which private equity
operates changes, private equity seems to be substituting political engage-
ment for regulatory avoidance (its previous approach) as its dominant bus-
iness strategy.  This shift is important because political engagement spells
efforts by private equity to avoid 10b-5 suits and the public enforcement
off which they frequently piggyback.
This section gives a brief background on George Stigler’s theory that,
when an industry reaches a certain level of maturity, it converts from
177. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
178. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (citing Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.L.REV. 97, 132
(2009)).
179. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve this issue. See Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 24 (2012).
180. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584-85 (1993).
181. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 253-54.
182. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1321 (2011) (hold-
ing that for a misstatement to be material the impact need not be statistically significant);
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011) (holding that plain-
tiffs do not need to plead loss causation to certify class).
183. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 7.
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avoiding regulation to demanding it.  The section concludes by examining
the JOBS Act (as applied to private equity) as an example of such a shift
in strategy, and one that threatens the role that private investor suits can
play in regulating the private equity industry.
A. The Demand for Regulation and Desupervision
Regulation may be actively sought by an industry, or it may be thrust upon
it.184
A half century ago, George Stigler argued that, as firms and industries
grow in influence, “regulation is acquired by the industry and designed
and operated primarily for its benefit.”185  Firms do not only demand af-
firmative regulations (e.g. direct subsidies, barriers to entry by rivals, regu-
lations affecting substitutes and complements, or price-fixing
regulations186)—they also lobby for “desupervision,” (regulatory “rules
remain in place, but are not enforced”)187 and exemption.  As discussed
above, exemption from regulation frequently allows funds to avoid private
investor suits as well.
B. Evidence for the shift—Lobbying & the JOBS Act
We [private equity] don’t want to be thrown out with the Wall Street
bathwater.188
Private equity, created as a novel solution to the public corporation
agency problem and designed to avoid the securities laws by flying “below
the regulatory radar,”189 no longer constitutes a niche industry.190  Private
equity funds “have grown substantially in size as well as political and fi-
nancial significance in the last decade.”191  The private equity firm
184. GEORGE J. STIGLER, The Theory of Economic Regulation, in THE CITIZEN AND
THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION 114, 114 (1975).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 116-19.
187. William K. Black, The Best Way to Rob a Bank is still to Own One, NEW ECON.
PERSP. (Oct. 8, 2012), http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2012/10/the-best-way-to-rob-a-
bank-is-still-to-own-one-a-postscript.html.
188. Levine, supra note 11 (quoting Stewart Kohl, co-CEO of Cleveland-based River-
side Co.).
189. Spindler, supra note 1, at 311, 312, 322-23.
190. Singer, supra note 50, at 275-76 (“Private equity is a valuable source of financing
for small and mid-sized companies, many of which have risk profiles that make it difficult to
raise capital through conventional channels. Private equity was popularized as a gap-filling
vehicle, a source of capital for those companies large enough to seek external finance but not
yet mature enough to obtain it from major lenders or public equity investors. Somewhere
along the way, the private equity model matured from a chic cottage industry to a $100
billion-plus investment sector.”) (footnotes omitted).
191. Diamond, supra note 14, at 3.
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Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (“KKR”), for example, with 560,000 employees,
is now the second largest employer in the United States.192
Commensurate with their growth in size and influence, private equity
funds have already moved to a strategy of engagement more in line with
the heftier profile—and the JOBS Act (both the lobbying for and subse-
quent use of) is the first clear example of the industry stepping out of the
shadows to design their own regulatory environment.  This is a develop-
ment that threatens the role that 10b-5 investor suits play in regulating the
industry.
This section describes how the private equity industry lobbied for the
JOBS Act, analyses two features of the JOBS Act—the ability to advertise
and qualify as emerging growth companies—that private equity funds can
take advantage of, and explains why those features threaten investors’
ability to bring 10b-5 suits.
The private equity industry lobbied for the JOBS Act: “[P]rivate equity
firms . . . wanted the legislation and they got it.”193  The private equity
industry had already created its own led industry lobbying group, The Pri-
vate Equity Growth Capital Council, in 2007 as a complement to less coor-
dinated lobbying efforts,194 by the time the financial crisis struck.195
When private equity funds got swept up in new Dodd-Frank regulations
the industry responded with “extensive lobbying of Congress.”196  This
lobbying (accompanied by a public relations campaign) only increased af-
ter Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign focused a negative light on the
industry, “based in part on fears that all this anger could result in costly
new legislative or regulatory controls.”197
The private equity industry (among others), for all its lobbying, got two
key things in the JOBS Act: (1) elimination of the ban on public solicita-
tion (advertising) of private offerings; and (2) the ability to qualify as
emerging growth companies and engage in “reverse mergers.”  Inves-
tors—and investor suits—are potentially threatened by both.
First, Congress added § 201(b) of the JOBS Act, which states that:
“[o]ffers and sales exempt under [the new implementing rules] shall not be
deemed public offerings under the Federal securities laws as a result of
192. Id.
193. Pam Martens, The JOBS Act Should Be Re-Named the Jumpstart Investor Fraud
Act, WALL ST. ON PARADE (Dec. 10, 2012), http://wallstreetonparade.com/2012/12/the-jobs-
act-should-be-re-named-the-jumpstart-investor-fraud-act/.
194. Levine, supra note 11 (“But the lobby group isn’t alone. Across the industry, pri-
vate equity firms have begun to speak up, viewing Wall Street as something of a cautionary
tale.”).
195. Private Equity Growth Capital Council, About the Private Equity Growth Council,
http://www.pegcc.org/about/ (last visited January 15, 2013); see also Levine, supra note 11.
196. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 7.
197. Levine, supra note 11.
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general advertising or general solicitation.”198  Private equity firms can
now “take out full-page ads in newspapers, purchase radio spots or even
buy commercial time on television.”199  Regulation D (“Reg D”) of the
Securities Act had formerly forced issuers to register with the SEC if they
engaged in public solicitation; now the SEC will be unable to “make sure
that the [funds are] following the law and operating above board.”200  As a
result, private equity funds   “have more control over when and how they
can take their small portfolio companies public,” and “can now lure inves-
tors who the government may label as “accredited,” but who really have
little financial education.  Before it was hard to attract the elderly widow
or the busy doctor, but advertising changes all that.”201
Second, the JOBS Act creates new loopholes for funds able to label
themselves as “emerging growth companies.”  Section 101(a)(19) amends
the Securities Act to define an emerging growth company as “an issuer
that had total annual gross revenues of less than $1,000,000,000.”202  Pri-
vate equity funds (among others) have in turn discovered that they can
create “[s]pecial-purpose acquisition companies” and “blank check” com-
panies—“basically empty shells with almost no employees”—that will fall
under the $1 billion maximum and can be used as a “backdoor route” to
U.S. stock listings or in mergers (frequently referred to as a “reverse
merger”).203  These include offshore shell companies incorporated in
opaque jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands.204
By qualifying as emerging growth companies funds (or their shells) they
avoid various “financial-reporting and corporate-governance require-
ments.”205  Qualifying funds, for example, “don’t have to comply with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirements that auditors review their internal
controls.  It also allows them to make fewer financial disclosures, use a
new, confidential SEC review process for IPOs and lets their bankers com-
municate more freely with potential investors. The confidential reviews
are designed to let companies sort out any differences with the SEC be-
hind closed doors.”206  SEC staff have already identified private equity
198. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(b), 126 Stat. 306
(2012).
199. Cyrus Sanati, Get a piece of my hedge fund!, CNNMONEY: TERM SHEET, (April 4,
2012, 10:22 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/04/04/hedge-fund-advertising/.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, § 101(a).
203. Emily Chasan, Meet the JOBS Act’s Jobs-Free Companies, WALL ST. J. (June 4,
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funds as businesses that might qualify as emerging growth companies
under such a scheme.207
Together lifting the ban on advertising and making it relatively easy to
qualify through a shell as an emerging growth company, make it more
difficult for investors to bring suit in a 10b-5 (or § 11 or § 12 Securities Act
claims, which are beyond the scope of this note) and defend their property
against fraud.  By avoiding SEC registration when advertising publically,
private equity funds can now target a much broader range of investors
without submitting to the SEC the important disclosure documents that
contain statements that a plaintiff might use to claim there was a misrepre-
sentation or omission (i.e. even if the advertisement itself was fraudulent
the plaintiff will not have a disclosed statement to compare the advertise-
ment to for inconsistency).  Similarly, if funds can avoid making financial
disclosures, including to their auditors, that narrows the scope of informa-
tion that investors can use to plead fraud.  In addition, by encouraging the
SEC to “sort out” issues—including fraud—behind closed doors, investors
are denied another source of information that could be useful in protect-
ing their investment, and suing if their is fraud.
The result of the JOBS Act is that, while “[p]rivate equity doesn’t have
to be so private anymore,”208 the industry may still be able to avoid disclo-
sure and private suits.
V. PRIVATE EQUITY DISCIPLINE: PROTECTING THE PRIVATE SUIT’S
ROLE IN ASSURING MARKET INTEGRITY
Even if “[p]rivate equity doesn’t have to be so private anymore” there
is still a danger that private investor suits—which operate most effectively
when firms act publically—will not be available to reign in the worst
abuses of the industry.  Judicially created barriers and JOBS Act loop-
holes threaten to prevent meritorious private suits, and future lobbying
may threaten private suits even more.  10b-5 actions, though not histori-
cally an important means of checking abuses in the private equity industry,
have the capacity to do so.  Policymakers should protect the ability of in-
vestors to bring private suits against private equity funds.
This section argues that 10b-5 suits have greater flexibility than SEC
enforcement actions, and therefore are better suited to evolve with, and
check, an industry.  Moreover, the private equity industry is currently
prone to fraud and other abuses.  Therefore, this section also proposes
that Congress and the SEC safeguard the role that private investors, using
10b-5 actions as a tool, can play by repealing sections of the JOBS Act,
issuing instructions to the federal bench, and preventing future lobbying
from threatening this unique tool.
207. Id. (SEC staff have already said that “business-development companies—essen-
tially publicly traded private-equity firms that invest in start-ups and small businesses—could
qualify for ‘emerging growth company’ status.”).
208. Sanati, supra note 199.
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A. 10b-5 suits are better suited to evolve with a transforming industry
than SEC enforcement
Private suits are the best bet to evolve with and respond to changes in
the private equity—despite the fact that 10b-5 causes of action (an SEC
rule, after all) are available to the SEC just as they are to private investors.
Indeed, the SEC needs to prove fewer elements of an action, and is not
limited by some of the caselaw (e.g. Morrison’s geographical limits) by
which private suits are limited.
Private investor suits are superior tools for several reasons.  First the
SEC is prone to regulatory capture (i.e. the “revolving door” concern),
and to political defunding (a serious concern given private equity’s new
lobbying strategy as described in Part V).209  Private investor suits are re-
moved from these capture concerns.  Second, SEC employees have no
profit motive, unlike plaintiff investors, and are resource constrained, so
they may under enforce the securities laws.210  Third, the SEC is fre-
quently complacent (the commission, for example, faced a congressional
probe for its failure to detect Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, which was
“not an isolated example”).211  Fourth, state enforcement—which other-
wise might be better tailored to local conditions or less susceptible to cap-
ture—is largely preempted by the National Securities Market
Improvement Act of 1996, which means that 10b-5 suits are the only alter-
native to federal enforcement available.212  Lastly, self-regulation of the
financial industry (for which the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) is primarily responsible) has largely been a failure, leaving 10b-5
plaintiff suits the preferred mechanism to guard industry accountability.213
In addition, private equity funds may prefer “the less draconian Rule
10b-5”214 to public enforcement, because: (1) more causes of action are
open to the SEC (e.g. § 17 actions), (2) stiffer penalties are available to
SEC (e.g. trading suspensions, cease and desist orders (which can be more
devastating because of their immediate effect), and criminal referrals to
the DOJ);215 (3) judicial oversight of SEC enforcement is weaker;216 (4)
investors, who are often repeat players, are less likely to bring frivolous
suits (though the opposite is true for plaintiffs’ firms); and (5) because
209. C.f. Stacy Kaper, SEC Budget Battle Leaves Enforcement in Jeopardy, NAT. J.
DAILY, Sept. 16, 2011, at 1 (“The question of how to make the Securities and Exchange
Commission work better drew very different answers from Republicans and Democrats on
Thursday, leaving the agency’s might in doubt and proving that consensus is still lacking on
how to regulate financial markets”).
210. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 62, at 744-45.
211. Id. at 745.
212. Id. at 743.
213. Not only did self-regulation fail to prevent—or even predict—the global financial
of 2007-08, but SEC can be overly reliant on self-reporting of violations. Id. at 748.
214. See Pritchard, supra note 55, at 33.
215. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 62, at 760, 770.
216. See id. at 770-71.
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10b-5 actions typically end in settlement, which are more private for
funds.217  Summarily, 10b-5 offers a resolution that is typically cheaper
and does not require disclosure to the SEC (i.e. a settlement can be kept
more private).218  10b-5 suits, therefore, are not only attractive options for
both investors and private equity funds; these suits are also one of just a
few options, if not the only option, for disciplining the private equity
market.
B. Private equity is prone to fraud and abuse
Some would argue that private equity does not need to be disci-
plined—by investors or anyone.219  Experience would beg to differ.  With-
out reliving the recrimination dredged up by the attacks on Mitt Romney
and Bain Capital, there are a number of concerns with the industry that
are real and require attention, including “financialization”220 and bid-
rigging.
Financialization—or financial engineering221—is a charge frequently
levied at the private equity industry.  Financialization refers to the strategy
of buying a company, taking it private, taking out new debt on behalf of
the company to pay investors, and then selling the company, whether the
company has been improved or not.  Though the case that private equity is
dominated by this strategy is likely overdone,222 the practice occurs.  A
recent example comes from Bain’s purchase and anticipated sale of Bright
Horizons Family Solutions.  Bain bought Bright Horizons for $1.3 billion
in 2008, but spent only $640 million—the rest came from debt “that ac-
crued onto the Bright Horizons balance sheet.”223  At that time Bright
Horizons had a market capitalization of about $1.26 billion.224  Bain then
217. See id. at 214-15.
218. Item 401(f)(5) of Regulation S-K, for example, requires a “person [that] was found
by a court of competent jurisdiction in a civil action or by the Commission to have violated
any Federal or State securities law . . . .” to disclose in periodic disclosures to the SEC (i.e. 10-
Ks and 10-Qs) the fact of that violation. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401. See also Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
v. Fehn, 97 F.3d 1276, 1290 n.12 (9th Cir. 1996).
219. Spindler, supra note 48, at 359-60 (“the Economist (2006) branded 10b-5 suits “ec-
onomic lunacy”—and an ever-growing academic literature has questioned the merits of the
fraud-on-the-market rule with a number of significant theoretical objections”).
220. Diamond, supra note 14 at 171.
221. See Kolivakis, supra note 76.
222. C.f. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 35 (“As exemplified in the case of
HCA, the PE owners have already repaid themselves and profited from their investment
while placing huge debt obligations on the HCA hospitals; but there has been no study of the
impact of these actions on patient care or services.”).
223. Dan Primack, Bain will benefit from Bright Horizons IPO, CNN MONEY (Jan. 14,
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“loaded the company up” with $922 million in debt, while paying itself $18
million in fees (should the firm “list” as publically traded).225  Bain plans
to exit the investment in early 2013 by taking Bright Horizons public
again.226
Loading a company with debt is not the only way that a private equity
fund takes advantage of its takeover targets.  In 2004 a consortium of
funds took-over Mervyn’s department stores.  The consortium then trans-
ferred Mervyn’s real estate assets to a company they controlled, “used
Mervyn’s real estate as collateral to borrow $800 million,” and “then
leased the real estate back to Mervyn’s stores at high rents in order to
service the debt and to extract value over time.”227  Mervyn’s went bank-
rupt, but profits realized to the fund “through the real estate deals far
exceeded losses on the retail side.”228
The private equity industry makes its living participating in buyouts
and public offerings, where the potential for collusion is stark.  In 2007 and
2008, for example, a number of companies sued Blackstone, Carlyle,
KKR, Apollo Global Management, and Bain Capital, along with JPMor-
gan and Goldman Sachs, claiming that they all “conspired to rig bids and
suppress prices for leveraged buyouts, depriving shareholders of billions of
dollars.”229  Blackstone Group President Tony James allegedly told KKR
co-founder George Roberts, “Together we can be unstoppable but in op-
position we can cost each other a lot of money.”230
C. Safeguarding 10b-5’s role
Protecting investors’ access to 10b-5 relief is difficult.  Federal judges
are appointed for life and have salary protection, and countering lobbying
efforts is no mean feat.  But there are a number of straightforward and
practical reforms available.  This note briefly highlights three suggestions.
First, the sections of the JOBS Act permitting advertising and allowing
shell companies to qualify as emerging growth companies discussed in this
note should be repealed.  Preventing public solicitation will help ensure
that private equity funds continue to raise funds from sophisticated inves-
tors who can properly assess risk.  Preventing funds from taking advantage
of the emerging growth companies loophole will require them to make the
disclosures that investors rely on to protect their investments.  Second, the
IPO process should be reformed.  Professor Pritchard’s scheme to abolish
IPOs (and replace them with two-tiered public-private system utilizing sta-
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 10, at 15-16.
228. Id. at 16.
229. Don Jeffrey et al., Bain Joins Goldman to Urge Dismissal of Bid-Rigging Suit,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2012, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-18/bain-
joins-goldman-to-urge-dismissal-of-bid-rigging-suit.html.
230. Id.
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tus-based, rather than transaction-based,231 liability), though beyond the
scope of the note, is an excellent place to start (and would retain 10b-5
liability as the crucial check on issuers of securities).232  Third, and more
generally, public equity funds and the limited partners who invest in them
should understand that settlements with investors are preferable to SEC
enforcement or political backlash.
CONCLUSION
The private equity industry is in flux, and could still go in a number of
directions—consolidation and demanding regulation or fragmentation and
avoiding securities laws—possibly some combination of both (and possibly
with hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds soon to follow).  Investors,
and plaintiffs’ firms, are numerous and equipped to evolve with, and check
(as “private attorney generals”) the industry.  Private equity funds need to
recognize what increased liability will mean, and parties both public and
private need to safeguard the important role that private investor suits
have to play in regulating the industry; policy makers, focused perhaps too
much on other private equity issues (e.g. whether to tax carried interest
differently), need to recognize the important role that private investors
can play in checking and even reforming the industry.
231. See Stephen J. Choi, Company Registration: Toward A Status-Based Antifraud Re-
gime, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 572 (1997).
232. See Pritchard, supra note 55, at 36; see also Langevoort & Thompson, supra note
44, at 383 (“Our proposal would have a permanent separation of the two classes of issuers,
public and reporting, with firms crossing from one category to another based on a fairly
simple metric of market capitalization.  We suspect that the differences between what is re-
quired of merely reporting companies would be significantly (and justifiably) less than what
is required of public companies.”).
